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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DeBRY AND HILTON TRAVEL
SERVICES, INC.,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
v.

Case No. 14335

CAPITOL INTERNATIONAL
AIRWAYS, INC.,
Defendant and
Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff-appellant DeBry & Hilton Travel Services, Inc.
("appellant") claimed below that defendant-respondent Capitol
International Airways, Inc. ("respondent") breached an alleged
agreement to pay a 5% travel agency commission to appellant
for certain charter flights and wrongfully interfered with
appellant's business relationship with a travel agency known
as Prestige Vacations, Inc. ("Prestige").
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DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN THE LOWER COURT
The Trial Court found that respondent performed all of
its obligations to appellant, that appellant understood and
agreed that a signed Charter Agency Agreement authorizing
appellant to receive a commission was a condition precedent
of its receipt of any such commission, that such Agreements
were not signed and that respondent did not interfere with
the relationship between appellant and Prestige.

The Trial

Court therefore entered judgment in favor of respondent,
with costs.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant's Brief appears to challenge the evidentiary
support for the Court's Findings and Conclusions on appellant's causes of action for breach of contract.

Although

appellant's Brief alleges that respondent's conduct vis-avis Prestige was somehow wrongful as to appellant, it does
not appear that appellant is appealing the Trial Court's
denial of relief on the causes of action for interference
with the Prestige-Appellant relationship.

2.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent disagrees with appellant's Statement of Facts
and therefore gives its own Statement of Facts hereinbelow.
Respondent's Statement of Facts makes evident the nature of
such disagreement.
A.

Description of Parties
Respondent is a supplemental air carrier operating pur-

suant to a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity
issued by the Civil Aeronautics Board ("CAB") under the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended, 49 U.S.C. §1301
et seq. A supplemental air carrier is authorized to engage
in charter transportation by air, i.e., the hiring of the
entire capacity of an aircraft, as opposed

to individually

ticketed service (49 U.S.C. §1301(33) and (34)), but may
carry only charterworthy groups.

Among the types of charter-

worthy groups are affinity groups, governed by Part 208 of
the Regulations of the CAB, 14 C.F.R. 208 (R. 808).
Appellant is a travel agent whose business is the negotiation of charter flights and the marketing of vacation
tours, including negotiating with air carriers.

Its owners

and principals are Robert J. DeBry ("DeBry") and Lynn M.
Hilton ("Hilton") who have been in the business of arranging
charters since 1963 (R. 813).

3.
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B.

Signed Charter Agency Agreement as Condition of
Receipt of Commission
A travel agent often participates in the arrangements

for affinity group charter flights.

Respondent ordinarily

pays a 5% commission to such a travel agent, provided that
all of the following occur:

the signing of a charter flight

contract between the group and respondent; the signing of a
Charter Agency Agreement by the group, the travel agent and
respondent which inter alia authorizes payment of a commission to the travel agent; the travel agent's performance of
all its obligations under such Charter Agency Agreement;
operation of the flight; and the payment in full to respondent for the flight (R. 810, 812).

(Please see Exhibit D-51

for the form of the Charter Agency Agreement.)

Appellant

confirmed that these requirements are standard in the travel
industry (Ex. D-38, 1|2) .
Respondent's Regional Vice President of Sales, Irving
H. Mansfield ("Mansfield") testified, without contradiction,
that respondent never pays more than one agent's commission,
that it never pays a commission without a signed Charter
Agency Agreement and that it makes the payment to the travel
agent authorized to receive it by the charter group in the
Charter Agency Agreement (Tr. 171-72, 183). By signing the
Charter Agency Agreement, it is the chartering group (i.e.,
charterer or principal) which authorizes the payment of a
commission to the travel agent designated therein (Tr.184-85).
4.
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The travel agent receives a commission by retaining its 5%
and remitting the remainder to respondent or by receiving
its 5% after the full charter price is remitted to respondent (Tr. 186).
Respondent's policy of paying commissions to travel
agents only where a signed agreement exists conforms to CAB
Regulations.

Section 208.31 of the Economic Regulations of

the CAB provides the following:
"Each agreement between a supplemental
air carrier and any ticket or cargo agent
shall be reduced to writing and signed by
all the parties thereto if it relates to any
of the following subjects:
"...(b) arranging for flights for the
accommdations of persons or properties;..."
14 C.F.R. 208.31a
CAB Regulations also prohibit a supplemental air carrier
(such as respondent) from paying a commission to a travel
agent if the agent receives a commission from the charterer
for the same service, and they likewise prohibit a travel
agent from receiving a commission from the air carrier and
charterer for the same service (14 C.F.R. 208.202 and 208.203).

C.

Origins of Subject Flights
With this background, we can turn to the specific facts
5.
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of this case.

In February 1973, appellant first had con-

tact with Prestige Vacations, Inc. ("Prestige") (Tr. 23).
Prestige, a newly formed travel agency, sought out appellant
for assistance in arranging charter flights (Tr. 45, 246,
287-88) for, as Mr. Edward Ford ("Ford"), the Vice PresidentSales of Prestige, acknowledged,Prestige was brand-new in
the business.

It did not have much money and, at that time,

felt that it needed appellant's expertise to arrange charter
flights (Tr. 288-291).

DeBry characterized Prestige as ambi-

tious and aggressive, but as just getting started and without
much money (Tr. 45).
Prestige's business included putting together affinity
group charters.
for such groups.

It is not itself such a group, but it acts
It is the group which signs the Charter

Agency Agreement and, by so doing, designates which travel
agent may receive a commission (R. 814).
Prestige had previously had contacts with respondent
and other airlines.

In September 1972, shortly after Prestige

was incorporated, Ford introduced himself to various airlines
including respondent (Tr. 245). Prestige attempted to arrange
charter flights with respondent, although none had resulted
in a contract (Tr. 293). Despite these contacts, Prestige
felt it needed help from appellant on negotiations and

6.
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on posting deposits.—'
Appellant first mentioned Prestige to respondent in a
letter dated February 20, 1973 (Ex. P-2). Mansfield
responded by politely warning appellant about dealing with
this new "retailer" and by instructing appellant to "get the
agent's contract" (Ex. P-3) .
Appellant has designated several groups of flights as
Chains A, C and D.

For convenience, respondent will follow

this categorization.

1.

Chain A

In February or March, 1973, Prestige asked appellant to
assist Prestige in arranging charter flights to be operated
2/
to Jamaica in the fall of 1973.

Appellant requested quota-

tions from respondent and other supplemental air carriers and
in April obtained quotations from both respondent and Trans
International Airlines.

Although appellant encouraged

Prestige to accept a lower quote from Trans International
(Tr. 249, 309), Prestige selected respondent.
1/

It is true that Mansfield advised Hilton on February 27,
1973 (Ex. P-3) that respondent's Chicago office had not
heard of Prestige, but even Mansfield concedes in the same
letter that that is not conclusive. In any event, the issue
is not whether Capitol had heard of Prestige, but whether
Prestige knew, or could easily have learned, of Capitol without the asistance of appellant.
2/

All dates mentioned herein are in 1973, unless otherwise
specified.
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Respondent sent the charter contract for six Jamaica
3/
flights to Prestige on April 30.- Respondent also mailed
a Charter Agency Agreement to appellant on April 30. DeBry
testified that upon receipt appellant signed the Charter
Agency Agreement and sent it to Prestige because "they had
to sign it" (Tr. 80). Respondent expressly advised appellant that signed Charter Agency Agreements were necessary
"in order to process your 5% commission" (Ex. D-ll).

By

approximately May 15, the Charter Agency Agreement was signed
by all three parties: respondent, appellant and Prestige.
Five of the six flights were operated (R. 816-18). Appellant makes no claim here for any commission arising from
the Chain A flights.

2.

Chain C

In April and May Prestige again requested appellant to
obtain quotations for charter flights to Jamaica for the
winter and spring 1973-74. Appellant requested quotations
from five airlines, including respondent.

When requesting

a quotation from respondent, appellant and respondent entered
3/
The initial contracts for the flights in issue in this
"~
case were signed by Prestige, although not the chartering group, as matter of convenience in order to expedite the
transactions and reserve aircraft. Pursuant to respondent's
routine office procedures, individual contracts for the
chartering groups were executed to replace the initial contracts (Ex. D-7, Tr. 127-28, 203-04).

8.
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into a "preliminary oral agreement of a very loose nature"
by which respondent agreed to quote the flights and to pay
a 5% commission to appellant "if the flights were sold and
if the agency agreement was executed in [appellant's] favor
making [appellant] the agent of record" (R. 819).
On May 8, appellant wrote to respondent alleging that
appellant "will receive a 5% sales commission on all future
flights or charters made by Prestige Vacation with Capitol."
(Ex D-10).

Mansfield rejected that claim on May 29.
"With reference to your statement that

DeBry and Hilton will receive 5% commission
on the future flights, this has to be strictly
a matter between you and Prestige Vacations.
If you will examine the current agency agreement, you will note that Prestige Vacations
also has to execute this agreement and this
holds true for any future flights.

I am sure

you can appreciate that Capitol is not in a
position to dictate to the charterer, or principle [sic], who they should designate as a [sic]
agent to handle their transactions" (R. 820).
As a result of a falling out between appellant and
Prestige, described in more detail below, Prestige approached
and began to deal directly with respondent.

Fourteen of the

originally scheduled Chain C flights were contracted for and
9.
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operated.

Each of the flights operated pursuant to a charter

contract between Capitol and the affinity group represented
by Prestige.
Mansfield spent four days in Salt Lake City trying to
get a Charter Agency Agreement signed in favor of appellant/
but because of the animosity between appellant and Prestige,
was unsuccessful (Tr. 171). Thus, no Charter Agency Agreement disignating appellant as recipient of a commission on
Chain C was executed (R. 8 21-23).

However, individual

Charter Agency Agreements were executed for each flight
whereby each group authorized Prestige to receive a 5%
commission (Tr. 202). As a result, Prestige withheld its
commissions from monies forwarded by it for the affinity
groups to respondent (R. 824).

3.

Chain D

In April and May Prestige also asked appellant to obtain
quotations for charter flights from various cities, including
four charter flights to Munich, Germany.

As for Chain C,

appellant asked for quotations from five airlines, including
respondent,and at the time of the request to respondent, appellant and respondent entered into a "preliminary oral agreement of a very loose nature

whereby appellant agreed to quote

the four Munich flights and to pay a 5% commission to appellant "if the flights were sold and if the [charter] agency
agreement was executed in appellant's favor thus making the
10.
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appellant the agent of record" (R. 825).
Respondent mailed charter quotations for the four Munich
flights to appellant (Ex. P-23).

Subsequent to the quotation,

appellant asked for another quotation for a series of eight
flights to Munich (Chain D) to be in lieu of the foregoing
four flights.

Prestige's letter of July 19 advised appellant

"If your program meets with our approval
we are then prepared to sign an Agency Agreement giving DeBry and Hilton a 5% commission
on the total package."

(Ex. P-24)

Prestige never considered appellant to be Prestige's agent on
Chain D (Tr. 310); it therefore asked a second travel agent
to get quotations for the same flights.

Learning this, respon-

dent declined to get "into an aution block" or to be "a shill
at this auction" by giving quotes to different persons for
the same flights (Tr. 169; Ex. P-27).
On approximately July 18 Prestige contacted respondent
directly regarding the Munich flights and followed-up with
a letter to respondent (Ex. P-24).

Respondent eventually

worked out an agreement with Prestige for the Munich flights.
As DeBry acknowledged, all of the negotiations for the
Munich flights were conducted by Prestige (Tr. 110, 281).
Each of the flights was chartered by an affinity group which
signed a charter contract with respondent; each affinity
group also signed a Charter Agency Agreement designating
11.
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Prestige as the travel agent to receive the 5% commission
(Tr. 203-04).

The 5% commission thereon was deducted by

Prestige from monies collected from the charter groups
(R. 825-28).

D.

Deterioration of Relationship Between Appellant and
Prestige
Since the acrimonious breakdown of the relationship be-

tween appellant and Prestige led to the filing of this action,

y
it is necessary to trace that relationship in more detail.
As indicated above, the relationship began because of
Prestige's two initial deficiencies:
of money.

inexperience and lack

The witnesses for both appellant and Prestige

agreed that the relationship between them began auspiciously,
that it developed to the point that a merger between the two
of them was under active consideration, that the relationship
then deteriorated rapidly and resulted* in a lawsuit by appellant against Prestige.
According to Ford, one of the critical requirements of
the relationship was for appellant to put up the deposits
with Capitol as an essential condition in order to receive
a commission on the flights (Tr. 247, 250-51). Appellant
4/
Respondent traces the breakdown of the relationship
"~
between appellant and Prestige not to argue that either
one was "right" in its charges against the other, but to
demonstrate that that breakdown was the reason for Prestige
dealing directly with respondent and the reason for Prestige
refusing to authorize the payment of commissions to respondent.
12.
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apparently agreed to that condition (Tr. 259-60).

However,

when it came time to post the deposits on the Chain C flights,
appellant at the last minute apparently refused to do so.
According to Ford, that refusal baffled Prestige and just
about ended their relationship.

Ford testified that appel-

lant's failure to live up to its agreement to post the deposit
"jeopardized the very movement itself with a loss of hundreds
of thousands of dollars" (Tr. 264).
Appellant also advised respondent that "If they [i.e.
appellant] don't put up any money, they will not be our agent"
(Ex. D-20, Tr. 262-66).

Appellant refused to put up the

deposits for Chain C, nor did it put up any deposits for
Chain D (Ex. D-20).
In order to avoid its threatened loss, Prestige began
increasingly to deal directly with respondent.

It renewed

the direct contacts which it had initiated with respondent
before appellant became involved.

As a result, it was able

to salvage the Chain C and Chain D flights by working out
the arrangements with respondent.
Appellant recognized that it acted as agent for Prestige
only as long as it could keep Prestige "happy" (Tr. 233;
Ex. D-14).

Therfore, during the course of their relationship,

appellant constantly pressed for a formal appointment as
exclusive agent for Prestige in arranging charter flights
(Tr. 267-68).

For example, appellant wrote Prestige on

May 21:
13,
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"•..we ask that Prestige Vacations appoint
DeBry-Hilton as their exclusive operators on a
permanent basis."
(Ex. D-14)
Prestige, however, never consented to any such exclusive
arrangement.
A number of things then came together to destroy the
once budding relationship between them:

Prestige was dis-

satisfied with the quality of service it was receiving from
appellant; it resented appellant's efforts to tie up Prestige
on an exclusive basis; it resented appellant's efforts to
treat every bid request by Prestige as a creation of an
agency relationship;

it resented the fact that appellant's

correspondent was filled with legal jargon, derogatory remarks and threats of lawsuits; it distrusted appellant's
overreaching in trying to get Prestige to commit to a 7%
commission arrangement (Tr. 266, 310, 267-68, 303-10, 273279, 296; Ex. D-37).

All this is, of course, in addition

to the breakdown of the merger negotiations between the
two parties and the failure of appellant, in Prestige's view,
to honor its commitment to put up the deposits with respondent.
By as early as July 5, appellant was remonstrating with
Prestige because it had not signed Charter Agency Agreements
(Ex. D-22).

On July 19 Prestige chastised appellant for

"dropping the ball" by not putting up the Chain C deposit
14.
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of $13,500, reiterated its prior statement that appellant
could become its agent "at any time you want to put up the
$13,500" and declined to sign Charter Agency Agreements in
appellant's favor (Ex. D-25).

By August 8 Prestige wrote

to both respondent and Trans International Airways that
appellant "failed to meet our requirements" (Exs. D-31
and D-32).

After more increasingly bitter correspondence

(Exs. D-33 and D-34), the parties ended in threats of litigation (Ex. D-35).

E.

And litigation, in fact, ensued.

Results of Breakdown of Relationship Between Appellant
and Prestige
The deterioration and eventual collapse of the relation-

ship between appellant and Prestige had a number of repercussions regarding the Chain C and D flights.

First, it led

to a series of acrimonious and threatening letters between
them (e.g., Exs. D-38 and D-41).

Second, appellant's threat

of a lawsuit caused Prestige to notify respondent by letter
of October 9, 1973 to "freeze" all commissions otherwise
payable to appellant by respondent "until the suit is
resolved" (Ex. D-43).

As a result of that instruction,

respondent's check for the commissions on Chain A flights
in the amount of $7,287 was made payable to both Prestige

15.
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and Appellant (R. 178).-' Third, the end of the relationship
between appellant and Prestige led Prestige to renew direct
contracts with respondent, as indicated above.

Fourth, it led

to the filing of a complaint by appellant against Prestige
in the District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
Civil No. 216397.

In that complaint, appellant alleged that

Prestige wrongly did the following:

instructed respondent to

withhold the Chain A commissions from appellant; breached the
alleged agreement to have commissions paid to appellant on the
Chain C flights; and wrongly denied appellant the opportunity
to earn commissions on the Chain D flights.

The prayer is for

amounts equal to the 5% commission for Chains A, C and D
flights (R. 435-42).
settled that lawsuit:

Prestige and appellant eventually
Prestige endorsed the Chain A check

over to appellant and paid appellant an additional amount of
$7,713 in full settlement of all of appellant's claims against
Prestige (Ex. D-54, p. 9-10).

As part of the settlement, the

lawsuit against Prestige was dismissed with prejudice and
appellant formally released Prestige from "all claims.11
(R. 432-433]).

5/
The "freeze" affected the Chain A commissions; it did
~~
not affect Chain C or Chain D commissions since no
Charter Agency Agreement authorizing the payment of those
commissions to appellant was ever in effect (Tr. 315).

16.
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ARGUMENT
A.

APPELLANT'S PRINCIPLE CONTENTION AMOUNTS
TO AN ALLEGATION THAT THERE IS NOT SUFFICIENT EVIDENTIARY SUPPORT FOR THE FINDINGS. THAT CONTENTION IS WHOLLY UNFOUNDED.

••:!.'. Appellant's Position

Appellant contends that it was the "procuring cause" of
the Chain C and D flights and that it is therefore entitled to
recover commissions therefor, despite the fact that Charter
Agency Agreements were not executed in appellant's favor for
those flights. That contention is in direct conflict with the
Trial Court's Findings.

The Trial Court found that by reason

of the dealings of the parties, the Regulations of the CAB,
the preliminary agreements between respondent and the practice
in the industry, appellant understood and agreed that no such
commission would be paid unless written Charter Agency Agreements were executed in their favor.

The Trial Court also found

that the only understanding between respondent and appellant
regarding Chain C and D flights were the "preliminary agreements of a very loose nature" and that appellant performed all
its obligations under such agreements (R. 799-802).
Therefore, appellant's argument is simply an attack on the
evidentiary support for the Findings.

If there is such
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evidentiary support, the judgment must be affirmed.-'
There can be no doubt that the evidence not only supports,
but compels, the Trial Court's findings.

Indeed, appellant

does not directly challenge such evidentiary support.

Instead,

appellant argues—without explaining—that the theory of
"procuring cause" somehow supersedes the evidence and the
Findings.
It is important to note that appellant does not allege
that it is entitled to recover by virtue of any contract implied by custom in the travel industry (Tr. 147, 212). As set
forth in the heading to its Point I, it alleges that it was
the "procuring cause" as part of oral brokerage agreements
and a unilateral contract (App. Br. 8). And a purported contract provision—that commissions be payable for being the
"procuring cause" without a signed Charter Agency Agreement—
cannot be implied because it would directly conflict with an
express term—that no commission be payable without a signed
Charter Agency Agreement.
111

[t]he introduction of an implied term into

the contract of the parties . . . can only be
justified when the implied term is not inconsistent

6/

Appellant expresses its argument in several ways: recovery on procuring cause, waiver of the signed Charter
Agency Agreement requirement, breach of a purported agreement
between appellant and respondent and an alleged failure to
make a finding on appellant's procuring cause theory. Each
is a variation of an attack on the evidentiary support for
the Findings.
18.
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with some express term of the contract and where
there arises from the language of the contract
itself, and the circumstances under which it was
entered into, an inference that it is absolutely
necessary to introduce the term of effectuate the
intention of the parties.111
11 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §1292, at 34-36 (3rd Ed. 1968).
While appellant's arguments are laced with attacks on
respondent for dealing directly with Prestige, those attacks
provide no support for its position.

They are merely a

variation on the causes of action in the complaint for alleged
interference by respondent with contract and business relations between appellant and Prestige.

The Trial Court found

no such interference occurred, and appellant has elected not
to appeal therefrom.
2.

The Trial Court's Findings Are Supported
by Substantial Evidence. Therefore,
Appellant's Challenge of the Findings
Must be Rejected.

The Trial Court made detailed Findings on all of the
principal issues in the action (R. 797-804).
only supports, but compels such Findings.

The evidence not

Even assuming that

there is a conflict in the evidence, the issue here is not
whether such conflict exists, but whether there is substantial
evidence to support the Trial Court's Findings.

It is clear

from the facts—many of them stipulated—that there is substantial evidence to support the Trial Court's Findings.
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It

is also clear that the Trial Court's interpretation of the
applicable CAB Regulations is reasonable and proper.

As indi-

cated below, appellant's arguments do not refute the evidentiary support for the Findings and Conclusions. Therefore,
the judgment should be affirmed.
"It is of no consequence what our opinion may be
as to the facts.

If there is substantial evidence

to sustain the verdict, this court is powerless to
set it aside."
Sutton v. Otis Elevator Co. (1926) 68 U. 85,
249 Pac. 437, 443.
". . .on conflicting matters the evidence on appeal
is to be viewed in a light most favorable to the
party for whom judgment was entered, and when so
viewed, if there is sufficient competent evidence
supporting the judgment, it will not be disturbed."
Christensen v. Christensen (1959) 9 U.2d 102,
339 P.2d 101, 103.
The parties stipulated and the Trial Court found that
appellant and respondent entered into a preliminary agreement
of a very loose nature whereby respondent agreed to quote
prices for each of Chains C and D.

The Court also found that

respondent did, in fact, quote such prices. Appellant concedes
that respondent quoted prices on Chain C.

Although respondent

refused to quote prices for the revised series of eight Munich
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flights, it did quote prices for the four original Chain D
flights, as it agreed to do (Ex. P-23) and there is thus
support for the Finding on Chain D.
The parties stipulated and the Trial Court found that
appellant and respondent agreed that commissions were payable
to Chains C and D only if Charter Agency Agreements were
executed designating appellant to receive such commissions.
The Court did not credit appellant's allegation that there
was any other agreement.

If found that there was not, and

there is no credible evidence to the contrary.
The Trial Court found that appellant understood and agreed
that commissions would not be paid unless such Charter Agency
Agreements were executed by Prestige, respondent and appellant
because of appellant's dealings with respondent, the Regulations of the CAB, the nature of the preliminary agreements
and the practice in the industry.

The Statement of Facts above

provides ample support for the Finding.
The Trial Court found that Prestige refused to execute
Charter Agency Agreements because of its falling out with
appellant and that such refusal was not caused by respondent.
Sections D and E of the Statement of Facts hereinabove make
it clear that such Findings are based on substantial evidence.
Indeed, there is no substantial evidence which would support
a contrary finding.
The Findings and Conclusions related to CAB Regulations
are supported by the evidence and the language of those
21.
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Regulations.

The Regulations provide that a written agreement

is necessary in order to pay a commission to a travel agent.
In light of the experience of appellant in the travel field,
the Trial Court could properly infer that it knew of this
Regulation and therefore knew that a written agreement was
required.

The Conclusion that the Regulation prohibits re-

covery here because of the absence of a written agreement is
a permissible, indeed necessary, interpretation of the Regulation.

The Regulations also provide that commissions cannot

be paid by a charterer and air carrier to the same agent for
the same service.

In light of the payment of $15,000 by

Prestige to appellant, the Trial Court was justified in concluding that appellant had received commissions from the
charterers represented by Prestige for the Chain C and D
flights and that, under the Regulations, appellant is barred
from recovering commissions from respondent for the same
flights.
Since the thrust of appellant1s arguments is an attack
on the sufficiency of the evidence to support the Findings,
the fact that there is sufficient evidence therefor means
that the judgment should be affirmed.

While respondent deals

hereinafter with the various arguments made in appellant's
brief, it must be emphasized that its arguments must fail
because they do not show there was insufficient evidence to
support the Findings.
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B.

THE AUTHORITIES CITED BY APPELLANT DO NOT
SUPPORT THE APPLICATION OF A "PROCURING
CAUSE" THEORY TO THE FACTS HERE.

In support of its "procuring cause" argument, appellant
relies on a quotation from

American Jurisprudence, a law

review article, a Utah case in which the claim of a finder
to a commission on the sale of stock was rejected, some real
estate broker cases and an alleged offer of a unilateral contract by respondent's advertising.
misplaced.

Appellant's reliance is

None of its arguments is in point.
1.

American Jurisprudence Quotation
Inapplicable.

Whatever the utility of the American Jurisprudence quotation on brokerage generally may be in other contexts, it is
beside the point here.

The only question here is whether

appellant is entitled to a commission and, even if one were to
concede that appellant acted as a broker, that does not resolve
the question.

Whether a broker is entitled to compensation,

and the amount of such compensation, is determined by the
agreement of the parties, not merely by calling him a broker.
Here, the agreement was that no compensation was payable
without a signed Charter Agency Agreement.

There is no

support for the proposition that designating a party as a
"broker" automatically carries with it a particular arrangement on the amount of compensation or the elimination of conditions to be fulfilled before any compensation is paid, and
appellant cites none.
23.
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If appellant is arguing that its introduction of Prestige
to respondent automatically requires commissions, the argument
is contradicted by the facts.

Ford testified that he already

knew respondent; thus, appellant did not even perform the
introduction (Tr. 245) . Moreover, appellant admitted that an
introduction alone does not entitle a travel agent to a 5%
commission on all business developing from that introduction
(Ex. D-54, p. 1 ) . Most important, the stipulated facts flatly
7/
reject such an argument.—
Appellant's attempted characterization of itself as a
"broker" is not supported by the facts.

Under the undisputed

facts, appellant was simply the agent of Prestige to obtain
quotations on charter flights from respondent.

That agency

included the possibility that Prestige would designate appellant to receive commissions.

7/

However, it also included the

"The general practice of defendant Capitol in processing
and paying a five percent commission is as follows:
(a) When the charter contract is sent by Capitol
to the travel agent for delivery to an execution by
the customer, a Charter Agency Agreement is enclosed.
(b) A standard cover letter goes with the documents
described above. That cover letter instructs the
travel agent to get all of the documents signed by the
customer and to himself sign the Charter Agency Agreement in addition to getting the customer's signature
thereto, and to return the documents to Capitol's
sales office.
(c) Defendant Capitol pays the five percent agent's
commission only to the agent which gets the Charter
Agency Agreement signed by the customer in his favor and
fulfills the requirements set forth in said Agreement.
(d) In no event is an agent's commission earned or
paid unless and until the flight is actually flown and
the amount of the contract therefor fully paid to Capitol."
(R. 812)
£* ft •

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

possiblity—known to appellant—that Prestige would not so
designate respondent.
2.

Appellant took that risk.

Wohlmuth Law Review Article Does Not
Deal With Commissions

Appellant cites a law review article for the proposition
that advertising by an air carrier means that a travel agent
arranging a flight for a customer on that carrier is thereby
entitled to a commission from the carrier.

What appellant

neglects to advise the Court is that the article deals with
the liability of travel agents for events occurring during
the customer's trip (not with the agent's right to commissions),
that the article deals with individually ticketed passengers
(not affinity groups) and that the author's discussion of
agency and brokerage is in the context of the customer's claim
against the travel agent.
The portion of the article on which appellant relies most
heavily is the author's suggestion that carriers give standing
offers of unilateral contracts to travel agents. Appellant has,
however, misstated the nature of the article.

Its brief

states that such standing offers are,(according to the author)
made by a carrier's advertising to travel agents.

In fact,

the author says they are made in the agency agreement. Here,
of course, the Trial Court found that there was no "agency
agreement" or other agreement requiring payment, absent a
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signed Charter Agency Agreement.—'

Moreover, the above por-

tion of the article is admitted by the author to be "one
suggested scheme of contractual relations . . . [which] may
depend upon the facts in particular cases" and not an analysis
of applicable case law.

Wohlmuth, The Liability of Travel

Agents, A Study in the Selection of Appropriate Legal Principles,
40 Temple L.Q. 29, 46 (1966).
in point here.

The article is, in short, not

There is nothing in it even suggesting a

decision contrary to that of the Trial Court.
Based on a misreading of the Wohlmuth article, appellant
contends that respondent's advertising constituted a unilateral
offer to appellant.
argument.

First, the article is no support for the

Second, no such advertisement is in the record and,

therefore, there is no factual support whatever for the argument.

The Court can hardly construe the terms of an "offer"

it cannot examine.

Third, the stipulated facts are directly

to the contrary (R. 812).

8/

Appellant further claims that the article states that the
travel agent "accepts" the unilateral offer merely by
bringing "the customer to the carrier" (App. Br. p. 10), However, the article says taht the offer is only accepted when
the travel agent performs three services: (1) books the client
with the carrier; (2) issues the required confirmation or
tickets to the client; and (3) collects a deposit or prepayment
from the client and remits it to the carrier (at 46). Thus,
Wohlmuth's discussion is contrary to appellant's interpretation.
26.
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3.

May Case Not In Point

Appellant finds support in Frederick May & Company v.
Dunn, 13 U.2d 40, 368 P.2d 266 (1962).

In that case the

Court denied recovery to a purported broker.

Moreover, even

the portion of the opinion quoted by appellant makes is clear
that the concept of "procuring cause" is more than simply the
introduction of a buyer to a seller.

Here, appellant did not

even introduce Prestige to respondent.

There were at least

two contacts between Prestige and respondent prior to any
activity by appellant.

Moreover, appellant understood from

the prior Charter Agency Agreements whifch were executed that
it was required to have Charter Agency Agreements exeucted in
its favor for Chains C and D and that it was required to perform its duties thereunder as agents of Prestige in order to
receive any commissions from respondent.
But the principal omission from appellant's discussion
of the May case is any attempt to compare the facts underlying
the quoted portion of May with the facts here.

The May Court

was clearly assuming that a broker is entitled to a commission
as the "procuring cause" only where the broker and his principal so agree and where there is no condition precedent to
such commission.

Here, the agreement and understanding of the

parties was to the contrary:

nothing in any agreement required

respondent to pay appellant a commission as an alleged "procuring cause" and the condition precedent of a signed Charter
27.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Agency Agreement is totally inconsistent with any such
requirement.
The Trial Court found that the only agreement between
respondent and appellant required a signed Charter Agency
Agreement as a condition precedent of any obligation of
respondent to pay commissions to appellant and that such condition precedent was not fulfilled because of the decision of
Prestige not to do so.

Based on stipulated facts and undis-

puted evidence, the Findings can hardly be attacked (R. 810,
812).

Thus, appellant had to prove its performance and failed

to do so. Nothing in May suggests that, under those circumstances, any commission is owing.
4.

Facts Here Not Analogous to Real
Estate Broker Cases

Appellant's citation of real estate broker cases is also
wide of the mark.

Real estate brokerage is obviously a spe-

cialized area with a body of law unto itself.

A real €>state

broker seeking a commission must prove the terms of his listing agreement and that the listing agreement was in writing.
It is true that the language of most listing agreements allows
recovery where the broker is the procuring cause. However,
there is no real estate listing agreement here, nor anything
analogous to it. Therefore, the "procuring cause" langauge
of the cases cited by appellant cannot properly be lifted from
them and applied—out of context—to the facts here. Here,
28.
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the only agreement expressly excluded recovery on a "procuring cause" theory.
Moreover, the real estate cases impose a duty to pay a
commission only

on the party who hires the broker. Here,

it is clear that Prestige, not respondent, hired appellant;
that appellant was working in the interest of Prestige by
"shopping" Prestige's requests for quotations to many airlines; and that appellant's principal was Prestige, not respondent.

Appellant itself recognized this when it sued Prestige

for commissions and recovered them by settling that action.
This action is simply an attempted second trip to the same
well.
There is no reason to analogize brokerage cases to this
case, and every reason not to do so. Brokerage cases rest on
the introduction of a buyer to a seller. A typical broker
represents a seller and seeks out a potential buyer who is
then unknown to the seller.

In most situations, there are

literally hundreds or thousands of potential buyers, and the
efforts of the broker are thus material. Without such efforts,
a seller might never learn the identity of a potential buyer.
Here, however, there is a very limited number of supplemental
air carriers, and it is obvious that Prestige either knew, or
would easily have learned, the names of all such carriers.
Thus, the "introduction" function of appellant—even if it had
introduced respondent to Prestige—was a matter of form rather
than substance.
29.
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Plaintifffs purported analogy of a travel agent to a
real estate broker is thus inapt, except in one respect.
Contracts for real estate brokerage commissions are unenforceable unless signed in writing by the person allegedly liable
for the commission.

Thusf a broker cannot collect his com-

mission, even though he brings the buyer and seller together
and the sale is consummated, unless there is a written
9/
contract.—•
The same is true of the purported agreement between plaintiff and defendant:
required to be in

as indicated above, that agreement was

writing as a condition of plaintiff's

receiving a commission under applicable CAB regulations, the
practice within the air travel industry and the understanding
of the parties.

Just as oral claims of real estate brokers

to commissions are unenforceable by statute, so are oral
claims of travel agents unenforceable by CAB Regulations
adopted pursuant to statute.
9/

"In the following cases every agreement shall be void unless such agreement, or some note or memorandum thereof,
is in writing subscribed by the party to be charged therewith:
11
. . . (5) Every agreement authorizing or employing an agent
or broker to purchase or sell real estate for compensation."
Utah Code Annotated 25-5-4. This fundamental rule was first
codified in Utah in 1888 and serves the same public policy:
it prevents conflicting claims and double recoveries. As a
gloss to the statute, Utah case law also prevents quantum
meruit recovery unless unjust enrichment was knowingly received
E.g., Watson v. Odell (1921) 58 U. 276, 198 Pac. 772; Case v.
Ralph (1920) 56 U. 243, 188 Pac. 640; Fabian v. Wasatch Orchard
Co. (1912) 41 U. 404, 125 Pac. 860.
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C.

THE REQUIREMENT OF A SIGNED CHARTER AGENCY
AGREEMENT WAS KNOWN AND AGREED TO BY BOTH
PARTIES. IT IS BASED IN EXPERIENCE AND CAB
REGULATIONS AND WAS NOT A MERE FORMALITY.

Appellant argues that a condition precedent of a signed
Charter Agency Agreement was simply a "formality" from which
appellant should be excused.

There is no support for such a

contention in the record here or in the applicable law. First,
it is undisputed that respondent's practice is and was to pay
a commission only to a travel agent designated in writing by
a chartering organization, to pay only one such commission,
and to pay such commission only pursuant to a such written
agreement.

The reasoning behind this practice is obvious:

while respondent is willing to pay one 5% commission, it
obviously wants to protect itself from the possibility of
being compelled to pay two or more 5% commissions.

It is

possible that more than one travel agent will claim the commission for a particular charter flight— in fact, that is precisely what happened here when Prestige and appellant both
claimed commissions on the Chain C and D flights—and respondent must thus have a means of protecting itself.

If a written

contract is the sole criterion of obtaining such commission,
the problem of possible double liability of respondent is
easily eliminated.
Second, appellant knew of the requirement of a signed
Charter Agency Agreement.
lant of the requirement.

Mansfield had expressly told appelThe "preliminary agreements of a
31.
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very loose nature" included the requirement.

Such Agreements

were signed for Chain A and, thus, appellant was not only
familiar with the necessity of the Agreements, but the precise
terms thereof.

Hilton and DeBry had been arranging charters—

including charters with respondent—since 1963 (R. 813). The
inference is proper, if not compelled, that they, as experts
in the travel field, knew of the CAB requirement of a written
4. 1 0 /

contract.—'
Third, Mr. DeBry acknowledged that commissions from another carrier, TIA, were paid only when documentation was
signed (Tr. 31); DeBry's letter to Prestige of July 5 confirms
this (Ex. D-22).
Fourth, there is nothing in the record to suggest that
appellant in any way took exception to respondent's requirement of a signed Charter Agency Agreement at the time of the
events.

Appellant was more than willing to go forward with

its dealings with both Prestige and respondent, knowing that
a signed Charter Agency Agreement was required.

It was only

after appellant's falling-out with Prestige that appellant
began to challenge the requirement of a written agreement.
Fifth, apart from appellant's presumed knowledge of
§204.31a, the Section itself bars recovery.

This is an

10/

Counsel for appellant alleged below that appellant's
president was an expert in the travel field. "I think
Mr. DeBry is qualified here as an expert witness due to his
years and experience in this particular chain "X" group of
flights." (Tr. 30).
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additional ground in support of the Trial Court's decision,
but is not necessary to that decision nor to an affirmance
by this Court.

Where a contract is required by law to be in

writing, the enforcement of rights based on such a contract is
conditioned on proof that the contract has, in fact, been
reduced to writing and signed by the parties.

Palo & Dodini

v. City of Oakland (1947) 79 Cal.App.2d 739, 180 P.2d 764.

D.

THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT APPELLANT'S
CLAIM THAT RESPONDENT WAIVED ITS RIGHT TO
INSIST ON A SIGNED CHARTER AGENCY AGREEMENT

Appellant contends that respondent, by its conduct, "waived"
the requirement that a Charter Agency Agreement be signed by
all parties as a condition of the payment of commissions to
appellant.

None of the subpoints under that heading deal with

the doctrine of waiver.

Nevertheless, respondent will respond

here to the arguments made by appellant.
Waiver is usually defined as an intentional relinquishment
of a known right supported by consideration or estoppel.
(Restatement, Contracts §297; 3A Corbin, Contracts §764)

That

definition alone is sufficient to rebut appellant's contention.
Nothing in the record lends any support to the notion that
respondent intended to relinquish its right to insist on a
signed Charter Agency Agreement—all the evidence is to the
contrary.

Moreover, respondent received no consideration and,

even under its own theory, appellant did not rely to its
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detriment (i.e., it did not tell Prestige to deal directly
with respondent).

It was a matter of complete indifference

to respondent whether it paid a commission to appellant or
not.

It was clearly going to pay a commission to someone,

and that someone was the agent selected by the charter group.
1.

There Was Nothing Improper In Respondent
Dealing Directly With Prestige

Appellant contends that respondent, by dealing directly
with Prestige, prevented execution of the Charter Agency
Agreements.

This is simply a variation of the allegation of

the complaint that respondent wrongfully interfered with
apellant's relationship with Prestige.

As indicated above,

the Findings are that respondent did not so interfere, and
no appeal has been taken on that point.
Appellant's position seems to be embodied in its allegation that "the net legal effect is that respondent fired
appellant in the middle of the negotiations"
That contention is untrue.

(App. Br. 19).

The evidence compels the conclu-

sion—and the Trial Court so found—that the falling-out
between Prestige and appellant led Prestige to approach
respondent.

Respondent had not hired and did not "fire"

appellant.
In short, the Trial Court found that appellant knew that
signed Charter Agency Agreements were required as a condition
of the payment of commissions, that such agreements were not
34.
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executed, that the reason for nonexecution was traceable to
the relationship between Prestige and appellant and not to
any interference or actions by respondent and that respondent
performed all of the obligations which it may have had under
the "preliminary agreements of a very loose nature" regarding
Chains C and D.

In view of such findings and the evidentiary

support therefor, and in view of the failure of appellant to
appeal on this point, its argument is unfounded and irrelevant.
Appellant has not appealed from the adverse Findings and
Conclusions on its causes of action for wrongful interference
with its relationship with Prestige.—'

Nevertheless, it

seeks to influence the Court in that direction by implying
there was something improper in respondent's actions. Since
the finding of no interference by respondent with the appellant Prestige relationship is strongly supported by the record,
appellant's argument that respondent's conduct prevented the signing of the Charter Agency Agreements has no force.

There was

nothing improper in respondent's actions, and insofar as apellant's argument depends on such impropriety, the argument
must fail.

11/

One can understand appellant's reason for not appealing
from the Trial Court's Finding of no interference. Where
a party causes a breach of contract by exercising his rights,
he incurs no liability. Gammon v. Fed. Milk Prod. Assn.
(1961) 11 U.2d 421, 360 P.2d 1018, reh. den. 12 U.2d 1891,364
P.2d 417.
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Capitol International Airways, Inc. Enforcement Proceeding,
46 CAB 385 (1967), cited by appellant, is not in point.

In

that case the CAB was faced with a situation where a travel
agent misappropriated funds paid to him by a charter group,
after a charter agreement between the group and Capitol was
signed.

Under the peculiar factual context there—including

a signed Charter Agency Agreement—the group was given credit
for the monies, thus enabling it to have its charter flight.
2.

There Is No Evidence of a Forfeiture

Appellant also argues that enforcement of the executed
contract condition would result in an "unconscionable forfeiture after substantial performance."

Since it was Prestige,

not respondent, which refused to sign Charter Agency Agreements designating appellant to receive commissions, that argument should be addressed to Prestige.

In fact, that is just

what appellant did when it sued Prestige for the same commissions involved in this action.

As part of the settlement of

that lav/suit, appellant was paid $15,000 by Prestige.
The premise of appellant's "forfeiture" argument is that
"Respondent entered into an oral brokerage agreement with
appellant under which appellant was to find a customer
[Prestige] . . . [and] to secure the business for Respondent"
(App. Br. 21-22).

The statement is made of whole cloth and

represents appellant's utter disregard for the facts. For
36.
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appellant to assert that its first contact was with respondent
and that it then sought out Prestige in behalf of respondent
is a mockery of the record and of appellant's own allegations
of interference with business advantage.
Furthermore, it is simply untrue to allege that appellant
"substantially performed" its obligations.

If, by that, appel-

lant means that it performed its obligations to respondent,
that is demonstrably untrue:

it did not do the one thing

which respondent required as a condition of paying commissions
— i t did not produce Charter Agency Agreements in its own
favor.

If appellant means that it substantially performed its

obligations to Prestige, that argument is unsupported by the
record and irrelevant to the dispute between respondent and
appellant.

For example, Ford testified that one of the prin-

cipal obligations of appellant to Prestige was to post deposits for the flights.

It is undisputed that deposits on

Chain C and D were not posted by appellant.

More important,

whether or not appellant performed its obligations to Prestige
can have no effect on appellant's rights against respondent.

E.

APPELLANT'S CLAIM IS BARRED BY CAB REGULATIONS PROHIBITING DOUBLE COMMISSION

Appellant's Brief attacks the Trial Court's Conclusion
that appellant may not recover because of CAB Regulations
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208,202 and 208.203 (14 C.F.R. 208.202 and 208.203).—^
While approval of that Conclusion is not necessary to sustain
the judgment, since it is supportable on other grounds,
respondent submits that the Trial Court was correct.
The Regulations are, despite appellant's protests to the
contrary, applicable to travel agents as well as air carriers.
For example, §208.203 applies only to travel agents. These
two regulatory sections prohibit the payment of commissions
by an air carrier (respondent) and a charterer (Prestige and/
or the affinity groups it represented) to the same travel
agent (appellant) for the same service.
Appellant sued

Prestige for the precise commissions at

issue here and appellant admits that the $15,000 it received
in the settlement with Prestige applied to "all claims"
against Prestige.

The Court below, after weighing all the

evidence, found that such $15,000 "constituted, at least, in
part, commissions on the Chain C and D Flights."
Fact XV, R. 802)
settlement.

(Finding of

A party is obviously bound by his own

White v. Pac. St. S & L (1899) 21 U. 23, 59 Pac.

527
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"The carrier shall not pay any commission whatsoever to
an agent if the agent receives a commission from the
charterer for the same service." 14 C.F.R. §208.202
"A travel agent may not receive a commission from both
a direct air carrier and the charterer for the same service."
14 C.F.R. §208.203.
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Appellant has not identified any agency services which
appellant performed for either respondent or Prestige which
were not simultaneously performed for the other (E.g.,
Tr. 228-31; Ex. D-54 pp. 4-8). Despite the force of the Trial
Court's Findings and Conclusions, appellant claims a right
to additional commissions for "the same service" on two
grounds.
First, appellant contends Prestige did not pay commissions
to appellant because Prestige deducted 5% before paying respondent, rather than paying the full charter price and receiving
a check back from respondent.
a difference.

That is a distinction without

Second, appellant reads the Regulations to mean

that the travel agent can receive commissions from both the
carrier and charterer, provided the total does not exceed 5%.
It is true that the portion of §208.202 quoted by appellant
(App. Br. 24-25) limits the amount which a carrier may pay
a travel agent to 5%.

But the relevant portion of §208.202

is quoted hereinabove and prohibits the carrier from paying
"any commission whatsoever" if the agent receives a commission
from the charterer.

In short, appellant seeks precisely what

the Regulations forbid.
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CONCLUSION
Respondent respectfully submits that the Findings and
Conclusions of the Trial Court are supported by substantial
evidence, that they are complete and that the judgment should
be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
RAMON M. CHILD
STRONG & HANNI
GINSBURG AND KOHN
By: JAMES A. KOHN
Attorneys for Respondent
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